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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OREM CITY, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
EDWARD JOSEPH GALLAGHER, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 20040375 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 as Amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying 
the Defendant/Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence accumulated by the 
investigating officer, on the grounds that it was seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. In reviewing this issue, the Utah Appellate Court has determined that: 
[t]he factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential 
clearly-erroneous standard, but the legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts. 
State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Patefiekt 927 P.2d 
655, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The appellate court's review of the conclusions reached 
1 
by the trial court is based upon the "totality of those facts..." standard. IcL; State v. 
Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225,1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The Appellant, however, contends that inasmuch as all the testimony introduced at 
the suppression hearing in this matter was proffered, stipulated testimony, the trial court 
was not required to weigh the evidence or determine issues relating to the credibility of 
the witnesses. Accordingly, the Appellant submits that the factual findings of the trial 
court should be given no deference in these proceedings (R. 152-168). 
This Court has held that a finding is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate 
evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of the law. Hoth v. White, 799 
P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Stated another way, factual findings are clearly 
erroneous if they are "against the clear weight of evidence, or the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). 
The propriety of the trial court's denial of the Defendant/Appellant's motion to 
suppress was properly preserved for appeal in the trial court. Defendant/Appellant filed 
his motion to suppress on May 12, 2003 (R. 13-24). The City filed its response on July 
3, 2003 (R. 25-39). The trial court conducted a hearing on the Defendant's motion to 
suppress on April 1, 2003 (R. 159-168), and signed its Findings and an Order on July 28, 
2003, denying the Defendant/Appellant's motion to suppress (R. 40-47). A bench trial 
was held on March 29, 2004 (R. 62-63), and the Defendant was found guilty and 
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sentenced on April 14, 2004 (R. 64-66). A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on May 10, 
2004 (R. 68-69). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative constitutional provisions in this matter include the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probeible cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal matter in which the City of Orem charged the Defendant with 
Driving under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44 
(1953 as Amended), as adopted by Orem City ordinance. The violation was alleged to 
have occurred on November 27, 2002 (R.166). After the trial court denied the 
Defendant/Appellant's motion to suppress, the matter was set for a bench trial on March 
29, 2004. At that time, the Defendant was found guilty. The Defendant was sentenced 
3 
:0045 and the Notice of Appeal was filed in this matter on May 103 2004 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The transcript from the April - - suppression lie ai iiig, totaling six and < im 
half (IJ I < ?) pages nl .nlu il festiiitoin, i iKarln; J hetvU . us E x h i b i t ' 1 " to the Addendum 
159-68). As indicated above, all the test imony received by the trial court at the 
suppression hearing was proffered, stipulated test imony which eliminated the need for 
the trial court to weigh conflicting test imony or evaluate tin < lul i lnl ih nil tin " ilncsses. 
A s i i i i i i i i i i i ' v n t ' l l k ' f i i i i i t f n i N ' i l , " : ( i | » i i t i l e d I r s d mm \ ii as follows: 
1. O n November 27 , 2002 , Mr. Medina, an electrician, employed by Utah 
Valley State College, was driving his vehicle and was following a car that was on 
Geneva R o a d i e u • vicinity u I ! N)(» Soulli in < hem, I Hah < W !'•'« lines I / ," I, l«' l<»4, 
1 
2 . A s Mr. Medina was traveling, the vehicle h e was following turned South 
on Sandhill road and Mr. Medina continued to follow him. M r Medina, who had been 
to the police academy, noticed that the \ cl inic in ""i" I '• >» \,i r\ ulni . iiif1 ,i t J, i \ mi-
pattern Specifically ]\ Ii IN 1 < >< lit u ;i i n iticed that the vehicle touched the opposite travel 
lanes three times (R.166 line 21 iu K I <>>, iin* !) . 
3 . The driving pattern observed by Mi, Medina led h im to believe that the 
driver might be unac * r9 
^ l e d i i ii K :( n ...tli n ied fc : > fc »llc r * > 1 1 n : v< chicle Mr. Medina noted that the vehicle continued up 
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Sandhill Road in Orem, Utah County, Utah, and finally pulled in front of a residence (R. 
165, lines 1 to 5). 
4. Mr. Medina noted that the vehicle was a souped up Mustang 5.0. When 
Mr. Medina caught up to the vehicle at the residence, the person driving it was already 
out of the vehicle. The person appeared to be wearing shorts, was tall and went into the 
residence (R. 165, lines 6 to 10). 
5. Mr. Medina called in a report to the police. The make of the vehicle and 
the license plate he called in was a Mustang with Utah license plate 858XYL. In 
addition, Mr. Medina reported his position as 2000 North Geneva Road, instead of 2000 
North Sandhill Road, where he was actually located (R. 165, lines 13 to 22). 
6. Officer Warenski, who was the arresting officer, had his testimony 
proffered also. Orem City dispatch had sent out a call on a green Ford Mustang. 
Dispatch did not list a plate number and did not list any particular part of Orem where the 
vehicle was seen. As the officer was driving Eastbound on 1200 or 1300 South 
University Parkway, at approximately 12:46a.m. (a little after midnight), on November 
28, 2002, the officer noticed a green Mustang that was parked in an area "quite a ways 
out," in the north parking lot of the Outback Steakhouse (R. 163, line 17 to R. 162, line 
3; R. 161, lines 4 to 10). The plate number on the Defendant's vehicle was entirely 
dissimilar to that given by Mr. Medina to Dispatch; it was 795LZN (R. 161, lines 14 to 
24). 
5 
7 < > H n - cr Warenski pulled behind the Defendant's vehicle, blocking it so that 
it could not back out. The Defendant could however, have pulled forward (R. 162, line 
23 to page 161, line 13). The officer turned his spotlight, illuminating the rear of the 
Defendant's vehicle, got < 
window I (he Defendant's vehicle, where the Defendant, Mr. Gallagher, was seated. 
When the officer approached the side window, Mr. Gallagher rolled his window down. 
The officer smelled the odor of alcohol and asked the Defendant to get out of the vehicle 
to do field sobi iet> tests (R 162. line s 5 to 11) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant/Defendant submits that the trial court erred in initially determining that 
the actions of the officer constituted a Level I, as opposed to a Level II, encounter with 
t h e D i • . • • i ' 
applicable to Level I encounter between law enforcement officers and citizens, instead of 
the standard applicable to Level II encounters. 
The Appellant contends that the initial actions of the Orem City police officer, in 
constituted a seizure under the relevant provisions of both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions and the case law interpreting those provisions. 
Further, the facts supported by the proffered testimony in this case support a 
6 
Utah Appellate Courts. In that regard, the Appellant contends that many of the facts 
relied upon by the trial court in its Findings and Order to support a Level I encounter is 
simply not supported by the stipulated, proffered testimony at the suppression hearing. If 
the trial court had stayed within the facts actually supported by the evidence, Appellant 
submits that the trial court would have been compelled to find a level II encounter. 
Having determined that the stipulated, proffered testimony support the conclusion 
that the encounter between the officer and the Defendant was a level II encounter, the 
Appellant submits that the City then has the burden of demonstrating that the officer had 
a "reasonable suspicion" before commencing the process of a level II encounter. 
Appellant argues that the facts of this case demonstrate that the information transmitted 
to the officer by the third party citizen through Orem City dispatch fell substantially short 
of providing "reasonable suspicion" for stopping the Defendant, as that term has been 
defined in similar circumstances by this Court. 
Lastly, the Appellant contends that based upon the lack of "reasonable suspicion," 
the fruits of the level II encounter must be suppressed, and this Court should reverse and 
remand this case, with instructions to the trial court to vacate the judgment in this case 
and dismiss the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
A finding is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support or is 
7 
induced by an erroneous view of the law. Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It is the Appellant's 
position that a substantial portion of the trial court's findings in this case are clearly 
erroneous based upon a total lack of evidentiary support. 
Appellant has attached hereto as Exhibit "2" to the Addendum, the "Findings and 
Order on Objection to Motion to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence," signed by 
Judge John C. Backlund, on July 28, 2003. The document was prepared by counsel for 
the Appellee using language taken directly from Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to 
the Defendant's motion to suppress. 
After the suppression hearing on April 1, 2003, the Defendant filed his motion to 
suppress with supporting memorandum on May 12, 2003 (R. 13-24). The Plaintiff filed a 
responsive pleading on July 3, 2003, nearly two months later (R. 25-39). 
Unfortunately, the trial court failed thereafter, to enter any findings from the 
suppression hearing, make any minute entries or give counsel for Plaintiff any directions 
in fashioning the Order. In fact, the Record is devoid of any reference to a ruling on the 
Defendant's motion other than the filing of an Order prepared by counsel for the 
Plaintiff, denying the Dependant's motion. Unfortunately, a majority of the facts included 
in the Order are directly from the City's memorandum in opposition to the Defendant's 
motion to suppress, and have no basis in the facts adduced at the suppression hearing or 
anywhere in the Record of this case. 
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For the Court's convenience, the individual factual findings from the trial court's 
Order are set out verbatim and then Appellant notes whether the factual basis for the same 
is contested. 
1. On or about November, 28, 2002, at about 23:30 hours, Officer 
Warenski was on routine patrol when he dispatched [sic] of a 
possible green, Ford Mustang traveling eastbound on University Parkway 
in Orem, Utah. 
Findings and Order, para. 1. 
The only testimony relating to the officer's actions was that Orem City dispatch 
had sent out a call on a Ford Mustang. There is no record as to what the call on the Ford 
Mustang was for and no indication that any of the information possessed by Mr. Medina 
was transmitted by Dispatch including the fact that the driver of the vehicle might be 
under the influence. Dispatch did not list a plate number and did not list any particular 
part of Orem. As Officer Warenski was driving Eastbound on 1200 or 1300 South 
University Parkway, he spotted the Defendant's vehicle, a green Mustang (R. 163, line 17 
to R.162, line 3). All other extraneous information including the statement that dispatch 
identified a particular area where the suspicious vehicle might be located, as contained in 
Finding No. 1, has no foundation in the record. Importantly, there is no evidence as to 
whether Mr. Medina identified a color of the vehicle when he called in the matter to 
police and whether the color was correctly transmitted to officers by dispatch. As noted 
above, the license plate number given by Mr. Medina was totally misconstrued by 
dispatch officers. 
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2. Officer Warenski was traveling east on University Parkway and had 
past [sic] State Street. He was unable to locate the vehicle while he 
traveled to 800 East University Parkway. He circled around and 
headed back west on University Parkway. 
Findings and Order, para. 2. 
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of Finding No. 2. 
3. Officer Warenski, crossed State Street and then observed a Green 
Ford Mustang parked in the norther part of Outback Steakhouse, 
located at 372 East University Avenue. 
Findings and Order, para. 3. 
There is no evidence of specifically how the officer got to the location where the 
Defendant was located (the Outback Steakhouse), but the rest of the finding is consistent 
with the evidence (Tr. p. 6, line 17 to p. 7, line 3). 
4. Officer Warenski advised dispatch he located a green, Ford Mustang 
that matched the description and entered the parking lot of the 
Outback Steakhouse. 
Findings and Order, para. 4. 
There is no evidence to support any discussion between the officer and dispatch. 
Further, aside from matching a description of a Ford Mustang, there is no evidence that 
the "green" color was a match with what Mr. Medina saw or not. 
5. Officer Warenski pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his 
"take down lights" and shined it toward the vehicle for officer 
safety reasons. 
Findings and Order, para. 5. 
The record is clear that the officer pulled behind the Defendant's vehicle, blocking 
10 
it so that it could not back out (R. 162, line 23 to R. 161, line 13). The officer then turned 
his spotlight on the rear of the Defendant's vehicle (R.162, line 5 to 11). There is 
absolutely no mention of "take down" lights and certainly no mention of "officer safety" 
considerations. 
6. Officer Warenski approached the vehicle and observed a male 
subject roll down his drives [sic] side window. 
Findings and Order, para. 6. 
The Appellant acknowledges that the evidence is that, when the officer got up to 
the side window, Mr. Gallagher rolled his window down for the officer. 
7. Officer Warenski leaned over and immediately smelled an odor of 
alcohol emanating from the vehicle. 
Findings and Order, para. 7. 
Again, the finding is an embellishment of the record. The evidence is that when 
the window was rolled down the officer smelled the odor of alcohol (R. 162, line 5 to 11). 
8. The Officer then asked for the driver's drivers license, and he 
produced a California drivers license that identified the male subject 
as Edward Joseph Gallagher. 
Findings and Order, para. 8. 
Although it is obvious that the driver was the Defendant, there is no evidence to 
support the rest of the finding and again it illustrates the lack of connection between the 
suppression hearing and the findings of the trial court. 
9. Officer Warenski related to Mr. Gallagher he was checking 
on him due to a recent report of a green, Ford Mustang 
11 
that was possibly driving under the influence. 
Findings and Order, para. 9. 
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of this Finding. 
10. Mr. Gallagher indicated to Officer Warenski he had consumed 
three or four beers about a half hour ago at the Outback Steakhouse. 
Findings and Order, para. 10. 
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of this Finding. 
11. Officer Warenski noted Mr. Gallagher's vehicle was running 
and observed the interior gauges to be turned on. 
Findings and Order, para. 11. 
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of this Finding. 
12. Officer Warenski requested Mr. Gallagher to submit to submit 
to field sobriety test, which he filed, and ultimately blew 
a .193 B.A.C. on an intoxilizer. Mr. Gallagher was arrested 
for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol. 
Findings and Order, para. 12. 
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of this Finding. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that this Court should determine the challenged 
factual findings are clearly erroneous and exclude them from its consideration of the 
propriety of the trial court's conclusions of law and order in this matter, denying the 
Appellant's motion to suppress. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT 
THE SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTED A LEVEL I STOP. 
12 
A. The Detention of the Defendant by the Officer Constituted a Seizure 
Under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution* 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
search and seizures." A similar right is contained in Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. It follows that "people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection 
when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalk." Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 
648, 663 (1970) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Thus, the Supreme Court has 
held that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 
walk away, he has 'seized* that person." Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. A person is deemed seized 
"even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." 
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648. 
In State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals 
recognized that the action of an officer in parking a police vehicle in a manner that blocks 
a citizen's vehicle constitutes a seizure under the constitutional provisions cited above. IdL 
at 882. See also, Struhs 940 P.2d at 1227. 
There appears to be no contest in this matter that a seizure of the Defendant took 
place. The contested issues begin with the categorization of the level of that encounter or 
seizure (R. 37-35). 
B. The Encounter Between the Defendant and the Officer was a 
Level II Encounter. 
13 
The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the encounter 
between the Defendant and the officer constituted a level one, instead of a level two 
encounter. 
Utah courts have recognized that there are three levels of "constitutionally 
permissible encounters between police officers and the public." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 
879, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions 
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be 
temporary and last no longer that is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause 
to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
Id (quoting State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)); see also United States 
vJMerritt,736F.2d223,230(5thCir. 1984). 
As noted by the Court in State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225,1227 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), the distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual encounter) and 
a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion) depends on whether, 
through a show of physical force or authority, a person believes his freedom of movement 
is restrained. See also United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). The test in 
determining what level of an encounter occurred is an objective test that takes into 
consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident. Struhs, 940 P.2d at 
1227. 
14 
The Utah Appellate Courts have decided two cases relating to the analysis that 
should apply to situations where the instrumentality used to detain a citizen comprised the 
use, in part, of the officer's vehicle. 
1. State v. Struhs 
In State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the defendant appealed the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. In that case, a deputy paramedic patrolling 
with her partner, observed the defendant's pickup traveling toward a construction area. 
She observed the defendant back his vehicle toward some barricades and a sign that read 
"Road Closed." Id Once there, the defendant turned off his head lights, and the deputy 
never saw anyone leave the vehicle. The deputy knew the truck was parked in close 
proximity to an area where a number of construction vehicles and equipment were 
located. Id. 
The officer was concerned about the fact that there had been numerous complaints 
of thefts in that area and accordingly proceeded to turn off all the lights on her vehicle and 
park approximately a car length-and-a-half in front of the defendant's truck, described as 
"nose-to-nose." IcL The officer then activated her "takedown" lights, located on the light 
bar on top of the vehicle, but did not activate her red and blue flashing lights. The 
officers then approached the vehicle and saw numerous syringes, spoons, and lighters. 
The syringe was later determined to contain cocaine. IcL 
As in this case, the defendant contended that the stop was a level two encounter 
15 
which was not supported by reasonable suspicion. In starting its analysis using the totality 
of the circumstances, the Court started with the location of the officer's vehicle: 
Defendant claims that the officer's action of parking nose-to-nose about 
one car length away when his car was backed up against a barricade 
essentially "blocked defendant in" so he was unable to move. While 
defendant was not completely blocked in, the officer's positioning of 
her vehicle is certainly a factor that weighs in favor of finding under a 
totality of circumstances that defendant was seized. 
Id at 1227-28. 
Secondly, the Court in Struhs noted, 
Equally important in our analysis is the officer's stealthy approach to defendant 
and her sudden activation of her headlights and white take-down lights. In State v. 
Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this court determined that no seizure 
occurred when an officer drove up and merely stopped behind a parked car on the 
side of a road. See id. at 12. However, the court did conclude that after the officer 
had seen a beer on top of the car and a man urinating next to the car, the officer 
had seized the driver when he activated his overhead lights. See id. (Emphasis in 
original) 
Id. at 1228 (emphasis added). 
Based upon the analysis of how the officer positioned her vehicle and the means by 
which she approached the defendant's vehicle, the Court continued: 
We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was 
seized. The time of night, the isolation of the location, the confrontational 
approach made by the officer, the officer parking nose-to-nose with 
defendant's vehicle, and the officer's sudden activation of her high-beam 
headlights and white take-down lights, support our conclusion. Therefore, 
for this level two encounter to be constitutional, it must be supported 
by reasonable suspicion. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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2. State v. Justesen 
After its decision in Struhs. the Court had an opportunity to revisit the issue again 
in State v. Justesen. 47 P.3d 936 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). In that case, the trial court had 
found the encounter between the defendant and the officer to be a level two encounter and 
granted the motion to suppress and the State appealed. 
In Justesen, a Deputy Carbon County Sheriff was on routine patrol of a desolate 
stretch of Airport Road one mile east of the airport when he came upon a Ford minivan. 
The minivan had no lights on and the deputy could not tell if the van was broken down, 
abandoned, or if the occupants of the minivan, assuming there were occupants, needed 
assistance. Ld. at 937. The officer pulled off the road and, with only his headlights, 
stopped six to eight feet behind the minivan. The only illumination in the area came from 
the officer's headlights. Accordingly, after stopping his vehicle, the officer activated his 
"take-down lights" (the two white spot lights located on the light bar on top of the patrol 
vehicle) to "illuminate the area" for safety reasons. IcL The officer did not activate his 
highbeams nor his red and blue flashing lights located on the light bar. Id. 
The officer exited his vehicle and approached the rndnivan. The minivan's brake 
lights illuminated as he proceeded to the driver's side of the minivan. As he continued 
toward the front of the minivan, the officer saw the driver in the driver's seat with the 
keys in the ignition, but the vehicle was not running. The officer then asked the driver for 
identification and smelled the odor of alcohol. The driver admitted to drinking, was asked 
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to do field sobriety tests that he failed and was then arrested. Id. 
The Court surmised that the trial court's decision was probably influenced by the 
decision in Struhs. Id. at 938-939. The Court then set out to identify the differences in the 
facts that justified a finding of a level two encounter in Struhs and a level one in Justesen. 
14 
[In Struhs], [w]e reversed the trial court, concluding that under the totality of 
circumstances [the] defendant was seized. The time of night, the isolation of the 
location, the confrontational approach made by the officer, the officer parking 
nose-to-nose with [the] defendant's vehicle, and the officer's sudden activation of 
her high-beam headlights and white take-down lights, support our conclusion. Id 
at 1227, (emphasis added). 
14 at 938. 
The Court in Justesen then summarized the facts in the case before it. 
In the present matter, the totality of circumstances surrounding the 
encounter between Stefanoff [officer] and Justesen does not support a level two 
stop. Although the encounter occurred at night in an isolated area, the factual 
similarities between the present matter and Struhs ends there. The confrontational 
and stealthy factors, present in Struhs are not present in this case. Stefanoff did not 
approach Justesen's vehicle in a stealthy manner, and was not trying to surprise the 
occupants, nor was he trying to "catch" them at something. Further, Stefanoff had 
not observed the minivan for a prolonged period of time under the cloak of 
darkness, only then becoming suspicious of the occupants' pattern of activities... 
Instead, Stefanoff came upon the minivan while on patrol, and, with his headlights 
on, approached Justesen's minivan. Stefanoff did not park "nose-to-nose" with 
Justesen vehicle, but parked behind it. At that time, Stefanoff activated his take-
down lights. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Stefanoff used the 
take-down lights not as a show of authority, but to illuminate the area. In sum, we 
view this encounter as no different than an officer pulling behind a vehicle parked 
on the side of the road in the daylight hours. In both instances, the encounters are 
voluntary and the motorist is free to leave, [citing authority]. To decide otherwise 
would force an officer to choose between personal safety, in this case by simply 
illuminating the area, or not stopping to render assistance to a stranded motorist in 
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an isolated area at night. 
Id at 939. 
3. Comparison of Struhs and Justesen to the facts of this case. 
It is important to note, as demonstrated in Point I above, that the trial court found 
that the actions of the officer in this case demonstrated a sufficient showing of authority to 
constitute a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment (Conclusion of Law Nos. 1 and 2 of 
Findings and Order, Addendum, Exhibit "2"). The only question remaining for this 
Court's determination is whether that seizure was a level one or level two detention. In 
Justesen, the latest of the two decisions, the Utah Court of Appeals, noted the factors that 
justified the finding of a level II encounter in Struhs as follows. 
First, the Court found significance in the lateness of the hour. Justesen, 47 P.3d at 
938. As in Struhs, the encounter in this case took place late at night, forty-six minutes 
after midnight to be precise. 
Second, the Court identified the isolation of the area. Id. Appellant asserts that this 
factor is important in order to distinguish a casual encounter between an officer and a 
citizen that is circulating among a general population and an encounter where it can fairly 
be said that the officer singled the suspect out and made a point to make contact with that 
particular individual. That explanation certainly fits the cases relied upon by this Court in 
this area. In this case, the Defendant's vehicle was parked at the northern edge of a large 
parking area. There is no testimony of any other vehicle that was in close proximity to the 
19 
Defendant's vehicle when the officer made his approach. Further, we know that the 
officer was focused on the Defendant because he was occupying the Ford Mustang that 
somewhat matched the vehicle described in the dispatch. 
Third, the Court in Justesen emphasized "the confrontational approach made by the 
officer parking nose-to nose with [the] defendant vehicle...." WL In this case, the 
officer's actions were precisely the same. The officer, after aggressively searching the 
streets for the souped up Ford Mustang, identified a vehicle that matched at least the 
"Ford" and "Mustang" part of the dispatch, and the officer, in an effort to confront the 
suspect, pulled behind the Defendant in a confrontational manner, singling the Defendant 
out and turned his "take-down" lights on for one purpose only - to demonstrate and exert 
his authority to control the situation. As demonstrated in Struhs and Justesen, there is not 
a requirement that the officer leave the suspect with no avenue of escape, but only that the 
approach be such as to be confrontational and directed to confront the individual. In 
Struhs. the deputy had observed the vehicle for a period of time, then approached the 
vehicle and activated her "take-down" lights, to surprise the occupants and catch them at 
whatever they were doing. In this case, the officer approached hoping to apprehend the 
Defendant before he drove again. 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts of this case match the aggravating factors 
identified by this Court mandating a finding of a level II encounter. 
Appellant asserts that it is equally important to compare the facts of this case with 
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the elements identified in Justesen that the Court found did not justify a level II finding. 
First, the Court found that in Justesea the approach of the officer was not stealthy. 
The Court pointed out that the officer was not trying to surprise anyone or catch them at 
anything. Instead, the officer had come upon the minivan during the regular course of 
patrol and with only his headlights, approached the minivan. The officer did not park in a 
confrontational manner but parked as a normal motorist would park if helping another 
motorist along a roadway. The Court found that the officer only activated his "take-
down" lights to illuminate the area and not as a show of authority. The evidence in that 
case was that the only light in the area was the light from the officer's headlights. The 
issue of officer safety was explicitly addressed in the evidence in that case. 
In this case, none of those factors apply. The officer did not approach the 
Defendant's vehicle while on regular patrol with an honest belief that the vehicle may 
have been stalled, abandoned or that the occupants might be in trouble. Id. at 939. The 
officer did not approach the vehicle in a courteous way, and certainly, there was not one 
iota of evidence that the officer needed take-down lights to illuminate a parking area in a 
mall parking lot for his safety. 
Secondly, and most important, it was clear in this case that, as soon as the officer 
approached the Defendant's vehicle, the Defendant was not free to leave. If the 
Defendant had started his vehicle and proceeded down the street, the officer would have 
initiated a traffic stop. It is clear that the officer was proceeding on the basis that he had 
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reasonable suspicion based upon the information communicated by dispatch. It is 
respectfully submitted that is the dispositive finding in this case. In comparison, if, when 
the officer in Justesen was pulling off the road, the motorist had started his vehicle and 
pulled onto the road, the officer may have followed the vehicle but would have waited for 
a driving pattern or other violation to initiate a traffic stop. That is why, it is respectfully 
submitted, that this Court has put such prominence on the factors that suggest that the 
approach of the officer predetermined that there was going to be an interrogation and/or 
field tests and/or search and not a casual conversation. 
Based upon the analysis contained in Struhs and Justesea it is respectfully 
submitted that the only finding that is consistent with the law enunciated by this Court is 
that the facts of this case constitute a level II encounter. 
POINT III: THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION 
BEFORE INITIATING THE LEVEL II ENCOUNTER WITH THE DEFENDANT. 
Before an officer can legally make a level II encounter, the officer must "point to 
specific, articulable facts, which together with reasonable inference drawn from the facts, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude [the defendant] had committed or was about 
to commit a crime." State v. Struhs, 940 P. 2d 1225, 1228 (1197) (quoting State v. 
Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals examined the issue relating to information coming 
from an informant in Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In 
that case, the informant called police and reported that a "drunk individual" had been at 
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his front door and had driven away in a white car, a Toyota Celica, and had driven out of 
his subdivision going east toward the mountains. The officer made a traffic stop based 
upon the information provided. The Court held that an officer can rely on a dispatched 
report if there was adequate articulable suspicion that spurred the dispatch. IcL at 234. 
The Court held that to undertake the task, the Court had an obligation of probing the 
reliability of the informant's tip. The first factor is the type of tip or informant involved. 
The Court noted that anonymous tips are at the "low-end of the reliability scale." State v. 
Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court held that citizen informants 
rank high on the reliability scale because such people ordinarily volunteer information 
based upon concern for the community and can be held accountable civilly or criminally, if 
the report is false. Id, at 20; State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The second factor to be examined is whether the "informant gave enough detail 
about the observed criminal activity to support a stop." KL, at 20; State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 
255,257 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court noted: 
A tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant observed the details 
personally, instead of simply relaying information from a third party. 
Id., at 20. The Court noted that there must be no hint of fabrication. Id. 
The third factor identified by the Court is whether the police officer's personal 
observations confirm the dispatcher's report of the informant's tip. IcL The Court held that, 
if the facts relating to the identity of the vehicle, the direction of travel and other details are 
confirmed, it is not necessary that the officer corroborate the intoxication. However, the 
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Court noted that such a test applies in circumstances where the alleged intoxicated driver is 
on the roads, potentially subjecting the public to harm. The Court noted: 
We therefore must consider the ever-changing equation used to balance the rights of 
an individual to be free from unwarranted intrusions of his or her freedom of 
movement and the right to privacy with the right of the public to be protected from 
unreasonable danger. This equation and the balance change with the facts presented. 
Id, at 20. 
Applying the facts to the law, the Court found in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, that 
there was a sufficient basis for the stop. 
Applying the three factors to the facts of this case, it is submitted that the officer did 
not have a reasonable suspicion. First, Appellant acknowledges that the elements of the 
first factor are met in this case. Mr. Medina is an identifiable source of information as 
opposed to an anonymous tip. Therefore, the information that can be attributed to Mr. 
Medina comes with a higher degree of reliability. Further, there is no question that an 
identified citizen, Mr. Medina, personally witnessed the events. See Mulcahy. 943 P.2d at 
235-36. 
It is with the second factor that the information stream relied upon by the officer in 
this case starts to unravel. The second factor is intended to determine whether the 
informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop. We 
know that Mr. Medina observed a green souped up 5.0 Ford Mustang on November 27, 
2002, traveling along 1200 South in Orem, Utah County, Utah. We know that Mr. Medina 
saw that vehicle, as he was following it, touch the opposite travel lane three times leading 
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him to believe that the person driving may be a DUI, a tired driver or a diabetic. It is 
acknowledged that Mr. Medina lost sight of the vehicle and when he caught up to the car 
again, it was parked at a residence, the driver was out of the vehicle and was entering a 
residence. 
Importantly, the second factor is not centered on what the informant knew, but 
what details he gave that were relied upon by law enforcement personnel. The only 
person, whose testimony was taken or proffered at the hearing was that of Officer 
Warenski. No one from Orem City Dispatch testified. There is a reference to a Dispatch 
Memo indicating that a call was on a green Ford Mustang and it had a specific plate number 
(R. 163, lines 17-19). The license plate referenced on the Dispatch Memo was 858 XYL 
when the actual license plate on the Defendant's vehicle was 795 LZN (R. 165, lines 13-14; 
163, lines 17-19; 161, lines 14-23). However, the Dispatch Memo was never introduced 
and no one testified from Orem City as to what Mr. Medina told them when he called and 
importantly, what information was transmitted to Officer Warenski. 
It is undisputed, according to Officer Warenski, that when the information got to 
him, all he got was a "call" for a green Ford Mustang and it did not have a specific plate 
number (R. 163, lines 17-25). The information stated the driver was east bound on 
University Parkway in Orem (R. 162-3). Officer Warenski was not even advised that the 
reason the call was out for the Ford Mustang was because of a possible DUI and, 
further, was not advised as to the observations made by Mr. Medina. 
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One of the prerequisites of the second factor is that the informant must give enough 
detail to support the stop. kL The Record in this case, as it relates to what was given to the 
officer does not even purport to provide a basis for any kind of stop. When the only 
evidence in the Record is that there is a general "call" on a Ford Mustang in an area of 
"Orem," what conceivable reasonable suspicion could arise in an officer's mind. He has 
not been provided with any background. He does not know what the citizen observed with 
regard to the vehicle or driver. He does not know what criminal conduct the person in the 
Ford Mustang might be engaged in, and critically, he does not have enough detail to replace 
the normal requirement placed on an officer to accumulate information supporting a 
reasonable suspicion himself before initiating a level II stop. 
Incredibly, the only evidence in the case, is that the license plate number that might 
have made it through from Mr. Medina to Dispatch and then to Officer Warenski, 
established the Defendant's vehicle was not the same vehicle Mr. Medina had been 
following. As such, it is submitted that there is no basis upon which the second 
requirement of Kavsville City v. Mulcahy. could be met with the Record in this case. 
The requirements of the third factor also fail because Officer Warenski did not 
observe any criminal activity or details sufficient enough to substantiate the information 
provided by the informant. Absent a risk to public safety, police officers are expected to 
make a significant independent corroborative effort to confirm an informant's information. 
Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 236 (citing Roth, 827 P.2d at 258). In the case at hand, Officer 
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Warenski observed the Defendant commit no act that could be construed as criminal 
activity before he made the seizure. The Mulcahy Court found that reasonable articulable 
suspicion is established if the officer confirms the facts relating to the identity of the 
vehicle, the direction of travel and other details. Id. at 238. 
As outlined above, the officer was not given any details of the informant's 
observations and therefore had nothing to confirm. Objectively, we know from vague 
references in the Record that Mr. Medina described the vehicle as being a green Ford 
Mustang with a license plate 858 XYL parked in the area of Sand Hill Road in West Orem. 
When Officer Warenski found the Defendant's vehicle, it was located a good distance from 
West Orem. This detail alone may not establish that the Defendant was not the person Mr. 
Medina allegedly saw; however, the total lack of similarity between the license plates does. 
Officer Warenski pulled behind the defendant's vehicle. He had every opportunity to check 
the Defendant's license plate before activating his "take-down" lights and approaching the 
defendant's vehicle. Had the officer checked the license plate, he would have found that 
the Defendant's license plate number was 795 LZN, not 858 XYL, as reported by Mr. 
Medina, who had followed the driver of the Mustang for a long period of time and was an 
individual trained at the police academy. By simply corroborating the license plate 
number, the officer would have known that, first, the Defendant's vehicle was not the one 
reported as a possible DUI by the informant and that, second, he did not have reasonable 
suspicion to initiate a level II police-citizen encounter. 
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It is important to keep in mind the evil that the procedure outlined above is meant to 
protect us against: 
If such a factual foundation were not required, it would be possible to validate 
bogus information or secure action based only on police hunches simply by 
sending information through police channels. Such information-laundering 
legerdemain is simply not countenanced under the Fourth Amendment 
(Emphasis added.) 
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,1278 n. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The logic of the Court of Appeals is clear. An officer upon seeing an individual 
cannot stop that individual on the mere hunch that the person may have violated the law. 
The officer must actually be in a position to conclude reasonably that a public offense was 
committed. To do so, the officer must be aware, through his senses, of facts supporting the 
conclusion. 
If an officer could stop an individual based only on legal conclusions of a citizen, 
without the need of specific need of factual detail supporting legal conclusion, a large gap 
would be created in the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment. In reality, officers 
would phone in their own nonspecific information, to justify stops. 
It is equally important to note that the officer in this case cannot justify his stop by 
the odor of alcohol that came after he approached the Defendant. It is the Appellants 
position that after-acquired information cannot be used to justify the initial stop. 
The issue was clearly adjudicated in State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 
1988). In that case, the officer observed the Defendant's vehicle which had Arizona plates 
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both front and rear. The officer concluded that the sticker on the rear license plate did not 
appear to be valid. The officer later testified that "something just struck me funny about it." 
The officer was unaware of the Arizona color scheme for determining sticker validity. Id 
at 1215. The officer followed the vehicle for a mile and determined the sticker was valid 
through December but could not tell which year. The officer stopped the vehicle to 
determine the sticker's validity. Id. 
After making the stop and approaching the vehicle, the officer determined the sticker 
was valid. After interrogating the defendant, the officer determined that the defendant's 
driver's license was suspended. The officer arrested the defendant, impounded the vehicle 
and as a result of an inventory search found 165 lbs. of marijuana in the trunk. Id_ at 1216. 
In holding that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was illegal, the Court stated: 
In the instant case the officer articulated "something just struck me funny about it" 
referring to the license plate sticker. Alone this does not approach reasonable and 
articulable suspicion. (If this is sufficient reason to stop, every out-of-state vehicle 
may be stopped for no reason other than the officer's ignorance of the license plate 
sticker color code.). 
Id . at 1217, n. 1. 
The Court then held that the officer's observations after the stop of new tires and 
shocks, a twisted-off gas cap, the jack in the back seat, the defendant's confusion over 
ownership of the vehicle and the smell was marijuana could not be used to justify the initial 
stop. The Court stated, 
While this [the evidence noticed after the stop] may have justified a further 
inquiry of the driver after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must be 
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present at the time of the stop and must be the reason for the stop. In this case, 
no reasonable or articulable suspicion existed to justify the stop. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id at 1217. The Court then held that all of the subsequently acquired evidence had to be 
suppressed. 
As in Baird, there was simply no factual basis to the support the officer's hunch that 
the Defendant was guilty of committing any offense, including DUL The subsequently 
acquired facts relating to alcohol consumption cannot be used to justify the initial seizure of 
the Defendant. 
In summary, the Record in this case does not disclose that the officer in this case was 
given any details relating to what Mr. Medina observed. He was told only that there was a 
call on a green Ford Mustang with a specific license plate. That license plate was not the 
one on the Defendant's vehicle. The officer was not even supplied with the rudimentary 
information as to the reason for the call on the vehicle or other foundation necessary to 
form a reasonable suspicion based upon the observations of a credible informant. Without 
the observations of a credible informant to rely upon, the officer had to observe activity 
that would constitute a reasonable suspicion before making the seizure. As carefully 
recounted above, he did not. Based upon an absence of reasonable suspicion, either from 
information garnered from a citizen informant or through his own senses, the seizure and 
detention was illegal. 
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POINT IV: THE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION 
OR AN UNLAWFUL DETENTION MANDATES SUPPRESSION OF THE 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE OFFICERS. 
Once the Court has determined that the seizure was improper or the detention 
unreasonable, the evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed. The case law is clear 
that any evidence obtained following an illegal seizure that was tainted by the illegal act 
must be suppressed. State v. Small 829 P.2d 129, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). As applied to 
the facts of this case, all of the evidence against the Defendant was obtained after the illegal 
seizure and detention. Accordingly, all the evidence is directly tied to the illegal stop and 
must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that many of the factual findings of the trial court are 
without any basis in this case's Record. Further, as to testimony or evidence proffered, it is 
submitted that this Court should give no deference to the trial court's findings because the 
trial court made no determination of credibility. Second, the Appellant submits that the 
facts mandate a finding that the trial court erred in concluding that the seizure of the 
Defendant constituted a level I as opposed to a level II detention. Third, Appellant 
contends that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify a level II encounter 
with the Defendant, and as a consequence, the seizure of the Defendant was 
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unconstitutional, warranting the suppression of all the evidence in this case. 
Dated this(Jl day of November, 2004. /^ C 
I MICH O, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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(April 1, 2003) 
THE JUDGE: Joseph Gallagher. Mr. Gallagher is 
present with Mr. Petro for a hearing on a motion to 
suppress. And present for the city is Michael Barker. And 
I think it's been indicated that the Court could receive a 
proffer. Do you want to make the proffer on the record, 
then confirm it and then just include that in your memo? 
MR. PETRO: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Your memorandum? 
MR. PETRO: Yes. Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Why don't you make your 
proffer then and— 
MR. BARKER: I think since you've spoken to 
Mr. Medina if you, I trust you to do that accurately to what 
Mr. Medina saw. 
MR. PETRO: Your Honor, Mr. Medina if he were 
called to testify I think would testify as follows. That on 
November 27th of 2002 he was in Orem. He's an electrician 
employed by UVSC. He started following a vehicle that was 
traveling on 1200 South in Orem. That vehicle turned south 
on Sandhill Road. He continued to follow the vehicle. He 
noticed, and the driving pattern may not be after Sandhill 
Road, it may have been before. But he's been to the Police 


























opposite travel lanes three times and that led him to believe 
that it was a DUI, somebody that was tired, or somebody that 
was diabetic. And so he followed the vehicle. It 
continued up Sandhill Road. It was still in Utah, or in 
Orem. And it pulled in front of a residence. The vehicle 
was a souped up 5.0 Mustang and so it kind of pulled away 
from him. When he got up to where the vehicle was the 
person that had been driving it was already out of the 
vehicle, they were wearing white shorts, appeared to be tall 
and went into a residence. 
The dispatch memorandum incorrectly lists the plate 
number because Mr. ... Strike that. 
The plate name that Mr. Medina called in was 
858XYL. 
He also, Mr. Medina I think when he called in he 
incorrectly indicated that he was on 2000 North Geneva 
Road. He was actually on 2000 North Sandhill Road is my 
understanding. He had Sandhill— 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: South sand, south Sandhill 
Road. 
MR. PETRO: Yes. He had Geneva Road and Sandhill 
Road confused. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well does the numbering 
change on Sandhill Road when it gets to the county. Does it 


























MR. PETRO: It does, well it does just south of 
2000 South right there. 
MR. BARKER: Okay. 
MR. PETRO: That would be correct. It would be on 
the south. 
MR. BARKER: Okay. 
MR. PETRO: South side of Sandhill and I think if 
Mr. Medina were called to testify that's what he would 
testify to. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PETRO: Is there any clarification of that, 
Mr. Medina? 
MR. MEDINA?: Well the Sandhill, the Sandhill Road 
part, the only time he hit Sandhill Road was when he came off 
Geneva Road to go towards, eastbound towards Sandhill Road. 
MR. BARKER?: So the original sighting was on 
Geneva Road? 
MR. MEDINA?: The original, the original sighting 
was on Geneva Road in front of MATC that's owned by the 
school. 
MR. PETRO: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Got ya. 
MR. MEDINA?: Went through University Parkway light 
which is on Geneva Road. Kept on heading southbound like he 


























take you to Provo. But there's a road that heads left from 
Geneva Road that goes over three sets of railroad tracks, and 
then it will hit Sandhill Road, then come to a four-way 
stop. And then if you go a little further there's another 
four-way stop which takes you up to Columbia Land which is on 
the border of Provo and Orem. 
MR. PETRO: That makes sense. 
THE JUDGE: All right. I'll accept the proffer 
and you can include that in the memoranda. And we'll excuse 
Mr. Medina. Thank you for being here. 
MR. BARKER: Thank you. 
MR. MEDINA?: Thanks. 
THE JUDGE: Then with respect to Officer Lorenski 
(phonetic)? 
MR. PETRO: I think I can proffer. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PETRO: Officer Lorenski (phonetic), the 
dispatch memo indicates that the call was on a green Ford 
Mustang and it had a specific plate number. Officer Lorenski 
(phonetic) was, his understanding was dispatch, he received a 
dispatch information was that it was just for a green Ford 
Mustang, didn't list a plate number, and I don't believe that 
it indicated when he got the dispatch call that it was in any 
particular area in Orem, it was just in Orem. 


























University Parkway and noticed a green Mustang that was 
parked in the parking lot right in front of the Outback 
Steakhouse. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PETRO: He turned his spotlight on the rear 
of the car, got out of his vehicle, walked up to the driver's 
side window where Mr. Gallagher was seated. And when he got 
up to the the window Mr. Gallagher noticed him. 
Mr. Gallagher rolled down the the window and Officer Lorenski 
(phonetic) spelled the odor of school and asked Mr. Gallagher 
to get out and do the field sobriety tests. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Did, what was, did he write 
down, did he, is the plate— 
MR. BARKER: Let me clarify. Wasn't the original 
dispatch that you had received that it was the driver was 
possibly eastbound on University Parkway? Because that's 
what you note in your, in your report. 
OFFICER LORENSKI?: Yes. The first sentence 
there, traveling on east University Parkway. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So let's include that in the 
statement. 
MR. BARKER: Yes. And then the other, the other 
clarify case I'd like is that, is to how you parked behind 
the green Mustang. Did you block it off, you know, T it 



























OFFICER LORENSKI?: Just from behind. 
MR. BARKER: Could it have backed out from where 
it was I guess is ultimately— 
OFFICER LORENSKI?: No, it would have ran into 
me. But it had access to pull forward. It was, it was out 
toward the north area of the parking lot, north. 
THE JUDGE: Could have pulled forward. 
OFFICER LORENSKI?: It was guite a ways out near 
where the gas station is. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. PETRO: Yes. And I don't think Mr. Gallagher 
disputes that. I asked him and he said he could have pulled 
forward. 
THE JUDGE: Ultimately what was the plate number 
on the Mustang or the— 
MR. BARKER: Ultimately Mr. Gallagher's plate is, 
let's see that. 
MR. PETRO: It was completely dissimilar. 
MR. BARKER: It is 795LZN. Is that right, 
Mr. Gallagher? 
MR. GALLAGHER?: YeS. 
MR. BARKER: 795LZN. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Totally not even close. All 
right. And that's where you go up to that point? 


























THE JUDGE: All right. If you'll just include 
that in your statement of facts. 
Officer Lorenski (phonetic), you're not here for 
the other hearing are you, Mr. Walters? We'll excuse you 
then. Thank you for being here. 
MR. PETRO: May I have just a couple of weeks to 





Yes, sir. Three weeks? Is that 
That's more than enough. 
Okay. That will be fine. 
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FINDINGS AND ORDER 
ON OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. 025210049 
JUDGE JOHN C BACKLUND 
THE COURT , having reviewed Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence hereby 
DENIES the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence on the basis that any and all seizures, 
searches, and or arrests conducted by the City on the date in question where properly performed 
pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Court having found the City's 
witnesses extremely credible makes the following findings: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about November 28, 2002, at about 23:30 hours, Officer Warenski was on 
routine patrol when he dispatched of a possible Green, Ford Mustang traveling 
eastbound on University Parkway in Orem, Utah. 
2. Officer Warenski was traveling east on University Parkway and had past State 
Street. He was unable to locate the vehicle while he traveled to 800 East University 
Parkway. He circled around and headed back west on University Parkway. 
3. Officer Warenski, crossed State Street and then observed a Green Ford Mustang 
parked in the northern part of Outback Steakhouse, located at 372 East University 
Avenue. 
4. Officer Warenski advised dispatch he located a green, Ford Mustang that matched 
the description and entered the parking lot of Outback Steakhouse. 
5. Officer Warenski pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his "take down lights" 
and shined it toward the vehicle for officer safety reasons. 
6. Officer Warenski approached the vehicle and observed a male subject roll down his 
drives side window. 
7. Officer Warenski leaned over and immediately smelled an odor of alcohol emanating 
from the vehicle. 
8. The Officer then asked for the driver's drivers license, and he produced a California 
drivers license that identified the male subject as Edward Joseph Gallagher. 
9. Officer Warenski related to Mr. Gallagher he was checking on him due to a recent 
report of a green, Ford Mustang that was possibly driving under the influence. 
10. Mr. Gallagher indicated to Officer Warenski he had consumed three or four beers 
about a half hour ago at the Outback Steakhouse. 
11. Officer Warenski noted Mr. Gallagher's vehicle was running and observed the 
interior gauges to be turned on. 
12. Officer Warenski requested Mr. Gallagher to submit to field sobriety tests, which he 
failed, and ultimately blew a .193 B.A.C. on an intoxilizer. Mr. Gallagher was 
arrested for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
L That a level one stop uis a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an 
officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time. State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 
767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). A seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street 
and questions him, if the person is willing to listen. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984,986 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Such consensual, voluntary discussions between citizens and 
police officers are not seizures subject to Fourth Amendment protections. Id at 986. 
2. That a level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
occurs when the officer "by means of physical farce or show of authority has some 
way restrained the liberty" of a person. Id at 986; See United States v. Menden hall 
446 U.S. 544, 552 100S. Ct. 1870,1876(1980). "When a reasonable person, based 
on the totality of circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the 
officers investigation, but because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure occurs. 
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The test for when the 
seizure occurs is objective and depends on when the person reasonably feels 
detained, not on when the police officer thinks the person is no longer free to leave. 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774.786 (Utah 1991); accord Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 
100 S. Ct. at 1877; Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767. 
3. That circumstances, when considered in light of all other circumstances, tend to 
indicate a seizure has occurred, which were first dictated by Mendenhall; "the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officers, 
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." State v. 
Bean, 869 P.2d at 986; State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 87 (quoting Mendenhall 446 
U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. at 1877). 
4. That Based upon Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990); 
LavtonCitvv. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965,967 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Deitman, 
739 P.2d at 617 (Utah 1987); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); State v. Justeseiu 47 P.3d 936 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), and the facts as 
applied to this encounter, was a level one stop. 
5. That this court having found the City's witnesses credible relies on the facts 
presented by preferred evidence and finds that Officer Warenski was dispatched that 
a green, Ford Mustang traveling east bound on University Parkway was possibly 
D.U.I. Officer Warenski, was on University Parkway, going eastbound. He traveled 
to 800 East on University Parkway, but failed to see the vehicle. He doubled back 
and just as he crossed State Street in Orem, he observed in the north-end of the 
parking lot of Outback Steak house a green, Ford Mustang. He pulled into the 
parking lot. He observed the license plate on the Green Mustang differed from that 
of the license plate given by dispatch. The parking lot was marked with parking stall 
slots. While in the parking lot, the defendant had pulled through one of the parking 
stalls and parked in the stall so as to allow his car to pull straight out without any 
obstruction as he exited the parking stall, rather than have to back-up to exit the 
parking stalls. Officer Warenski pulled in behind the defendant and turned his ''take 
down" (spot light) on to illuminate the area for Officers safety. Officer Warenski 
was parked so as to not block in the defendant. Officer Warenski noted that the 
defendant could have pulled forward, without obstruction, and clearly exited the 
parking lot. The Officer approached the defendant and the male driver rolled down 
his driver's side widow. The officer leaned over and immediately smelled a strong 
odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. The officer then asked for a driver 
license, which was provided and identified the driver as Edward Joseph Gallagher. 
The driver indicated he had consumed some alcohol and Officer Warenski asked him 
to submit to field sobriety test, which the defendant performed poorly and arrested 
for D.U.I. 
That in response to search for a the vehicle, Officer Warenski was the only officer 
present at the scene. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. He used no lights or sirens, 
except for his take-down lights and the use of take-down lights to illuminate the area 
is not a show of authority. State v. Justesen, 47 P.3d 936, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 
2002). The officer did not call out to the defendant or tell him he must stay. State v. 
Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. Office Warenski did not display his weapon, nor did he 
touch, restrain, or threaten the defendant. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. The 
defendant voluntarily rolled down his window and the Officer merely asked for 
identification. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. Thus, the fact pattern of this case is 
level one encounter. 
That the case of State v. Cerillo, 114 Wn App. 259 54 P.3d 1250 (Wash. App. 3 
Div. 2002) is inapplicable to the Mendenhall factors based upon the facts that the 
State of Washington conceded in their appellate brief the stop did not support a Level 
One stop under Terry, so the Court of Appeals analyzed the first initial stop under 
another warrantless exception as argued by the State; that being the "community 
caretaker function." This exception does not qualify under the holdings of Terry 
because for a proper Terry analysis, the Court must decide if the stop or seizure, did 
or did not occur, by applying the Mendenhall factors as adopted in State v. Trujillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
8. The fact that the officer was investigating a possible crime is inapplicable for a level 
two Terry analysis to determine 'seizure' as illustrated by Deitman (officers 
responded to a burglar alarm and followed a truck he observed pull away from the 
scene), Jackson (officer observed a vehicle that matched a description of a vehicle 
wanted in a robbery) , Maestas (two separate citizens informed an officer that an 
intoxicated person was at a nearby store asking for directions to the Utah State Liquor 
store, and provided the officer a description of that person's vehicle ), and Bean 
(deputy heard a radio broadcast that police were looking for two male suspects in the 
area and the deputy observed the defendant and his companion walking. The deputy 
stopped his car and approached them). These cases all held the encounter with the 
defendant's were all level one stops under Terry. 
9. Therefore, this Court finds the witnesses testimony credible and denies the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. This court finds that the State has established a prima 
facia case to submit this case to a finder of fact and any and all seizures, searches, 
and or arrests conducted by the City on the date in question where properly 
performed pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
and the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing legal points and authorities this Court respectfully denies 
the defendant's motion to suppress any and all seizures, searches, and or arrests conducted by the 
City on the date in question, and that any and all seizures, searches, and or arrests where properly 
performed pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Court finds the City's witnesses credible 
and believable. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence v/hen viewed in light most favorable 
to the State the State has established a prima facia case that the defendant did commit the alleged 
criminal charges. Thus this case may be submitted to a finder of fact. 
ORDER 
The Court, after hearing the Defendant's Motion Suppress and the City' s motion in Obj ection 
to the Motion to Suppress, hereby denies the Defendant's Motion pursuant to the facts and points 
of law cited in the City's motion in objection. IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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